

Alan Boyd

October 2, 2001

By Telephone

Zachary Schrag, Interviewer

The conversation was transcribed by Douglas Wilson. Mr. Schrag and Mr. Boyd each reviewed the transcript and made minor corrections, which are incorporated into this version.

Schrag: Zachary Schrag is interviewing Mr. Alan Boyd. It is October 2, 2001 at nine in the morning. We are doing this by telephone. I am in Washington, D.C., and Mr. Boyd is in Lady Lake, Florida.

I would like to start with this fairly open-ended question, which is that, given the popularity of the Interstate Highway Act and the power of the Bureau of Public Roads and its allies in Congress, in retrospect it seems rather surprising that the nation's first Secretary of Transportation would do anything that so antagonized the highway lobby and highway partisans in Congress as questioning the need for the Three Sisters bridge in Washington, which by 1967 was already a symbol of a lot of debated urban interstates. Maybe you could just tell me some about your thoughts on the urban

component of the interstate highway system and the Three Sisters bridge in particular.

Boyd: Okay. First and foremost, I believe I am correct in saying that the organic act creating the Department of Transportation was, to my knowledge, the first piece of federal legislation that required a look at the environmental impact of projects financed through various activities of the Department of Transportation. That was a major consideration for the first time in deciding on the approval or modification or disapproval of specific projects. Of course, that was a shock to the highway people because -- first of all, let me say they are very fine people. I have never dealt with finer professional and more honorable and honest people. Their view of life was that God's greatest gift to America was concrete. They really believed that paving America was the greatest thing that could be done for America. I didn't happen to share that view. That was one aspect -- the environmental.

Second, Bob Weaver was Secretary of HUD [Housing and Urban Development]. He asked me to come to a meeting one day. There were some black people from

Baltimore who were being uprooted by the proposed interstate going through Baltimore. One of these men told me his life story, in effect. He said that as a kid he had gone to school, he had gotten through high school, he got a job as a stevedore. He went into the army as a volunteer in World War II. He came out and went back to stevedoring, bought a little house, raised two children, put them through college, and always paid his mortgage, even if he didn't have enough money to put food on the table.

Then along comes the highway system, and say, "For the greater good, we're going to take your house. We're going to pay you" -- I think he said -- "\$28,000." He said, "There is no way I can buy a house like the one I have for \$28,000, and I haven't got any money other than that, other than what you give me." He said, "White folks -- that ain't fair." That made an impact, I'll tell you. It really made an impact on me.

So we get to the Three Sisters bridge. I've forgotten. There were several different proposed lines at different times, and I don't really remember where we were at the start. I thought,

first of all, they were looking at some pretty expensive real estate and also, if I'm not mistaken, in the upper reaches of going through some of the poorer communities. One of the things that was already becoming apparent was that the interstate in many ways was creating a Chinese wall in the communities. It just didn't make sense to me to do that. I think they were going through Georgetown, I believe, as I said. I couldn't see the value of it in terms of what it would do for the community. Secondly, I was really concerned, not only about DC but about other cities, where the interstate system was like a thirty-six-inch pipe with the exits in the city being, say, six-inch pipes pouring traffic onto city streets that had no way of being widened and where there was generally congestion already. That just didn't seem to me to make a bit of sense. There I am.

Schrag: Okay. This is very intriguing. When you met the Baltimore man who was threatened with losing his home, was this when you were Secretary of Transportation or when you were in the Commerce Department?

Boyd: I believe I was already Secretary of Transportation, but I'm not positive about that.

Schrag: I guess my question is, had you ever thought that the urban segments of the interstates -- which, of course, were the most controversial -- made a lot of sense? For example, when you were Deputy Secretary of Commerce for transportation --

Boyd: No, I never did. I remember -- if you really want to know, I remember back before World War II driving through Sumter, South Carolina on Saturday afternoon where the communities used to always want the main roads going right through the middle of their cities. You couldn't move in Sumter, South Carolina in 1939. I thought this was the most stupid thing in the world. The businessmen think they're going to get more business, and people can't get in and they can't get out. It just made no sense to me from an economic point of view, not to mention the environmental.

Schrag: I'm beginning to get it. You came obviously from an aviation background into the job. You never really had this kind of road-building background that John Volpe did after you.

Boyd: No, but if you don't know, I should tell you that I was general counsel for the Florida State Turnpike Authority at one time.

Schrag: Okay. How did you see highways in that position? I mean, I assume you saw some roles for highways, but was there a distinction between inter-city and within cities?

Boyd: Absolutely. I am not anti-highway at all, not at all. But I think there is a major value to cities, to the population density, and so forth, that the concentration of services and their distribution. I do not think that by and large the welfare of the city is served by urban expressways going through the middle of the community.

Schrag: So the rallying cry of the anti-freeway activists in Washington eventually became that it made perfect sense to connect cities with interstates and to have them go to beltways, but once traffic had reached the beltway, cars and trucks could take regular arterials downtown if they had business there.

Boyd: Yes. I generally accept that idea. Nothing is absolute, but as a general proposition, I bought that. I do buy it still.

Schrag: Yet you were put in charge of a department that included the Bureau of Public Roads that was quite committed to building the urban segments as well.

Boyd: Yes, that's true. The Department of Transportation in some ways represented a real sea change in policy.

Schrag: Okay. Maybe I should step back and ask who was responsible for that sea change. In particular, was President [Lyndon B.] Johnson himself involved in this issue?

Boyd: No, he was not. He was involved in highway beautification in a big way, but that's a different story. No. He wanted to see the interstate built and completed, no question about that. But he did not get into the various local issues, such as -- we had a major conflagration over Overton Park in Memphis, for example, and Breckenridge Park in San Antonio, and some others not quite as hot. But he didn't get into those. He did want to see the interstate built. He was all in favor of jobs. No. I'll tell you, several people within the organization had great influence in my thinking. One, of course, was Lowell Bridwell. I don't know

how much you know about Lowell, but he was a Scripps-Howard newspaper reporter. He did a lot of reporting on highway construction before he got into the government. He was really very knowledgeable about highways. He knew a lot about corruption in the road-building business. So far as I knew, there was never a whiff of corruption in the Bureau of Public Roads or the Federal Highway Administration. As I said, [they were] very honorable people.

Lowell had a strong environmental view.

Also, Cecil Mackey, who was Assistant Secretary for Policy, had a strong environmental view. Paul Sitton, who came to the department from OMB [Office of Management and Budget] as deputy undersecretary, had the same [view]. These were three really bright and dedicated human beings. I think they certainly influenced me.

I had a lot of respect for people in the Bureau of Public Roads and subsequently Federal Highway Administration. But their focus -- they were myopic. One of the things -- just an aside. It used to make me mad but then [would] tickle me too. When I would say, "We're going to have to change course here 180 degrees," after we had argued about



it for a while, they would say, "Well, we've always done it that way." Sometimes I think they really believed it.

But they also had one of the great bureaucratic mechanisms that one comes to understand. I would ask for information report on something and recommendations by such and such a date. The day before the due date I would get a stack of papers about a foot high which, of course, was totally impossible to read. But you could be sure that the whole purpose of that was to support their point of view.

Schrag: I guess it strikes me even still as a little surprising that you got the job as the first secretary of the department, given that you were skeptical. I can certainly understand a president making a deliberate decision to say, "The Bureau of Public Roads is out of control. Let's put in someone who will not just rubber stamp their recommendations." But if Johnson wasn't thinking along those lines, how was it that you were selected to watch over these engineers in the bureau?

Boyd: First of all, I don't think, at least until I got involved in the Three Sisters and Overton Park, that the road builders thought of me as an enemy. I don't think I ever made any speeches. I'm not sure I even thought about it a hell of a lot, to tell you the truth, although I had given quite a bit of thought, at least after I went to the Commerce Department, about the need for a total transportation system function instead of all the disparate agencies. I remember one example before the department was created -- building a new airport in Omaha, Nebraska, building the interstate system that went right by it with no connection. One was Federal Aviation Agency and the other was Bureau of Public Roads. There just was no common ground at all. These people didn't talk to each other. I hadn't really thought about it. I hadn't really focused on it and certainly hadn't become an enemy of the road builders. I think I tried to convince them that I was not an enemy after I had disagreed with where they were being built. It wasn't that I was against the roads. I was against the roads exactly where they were [that] they were planning.

Another thing was that Johnson nominated me in October of '66 after the organic act creating the department. I had been in Washington since 1959 in the government. I served as chairman of the CAB from '61 to '65 and then at the Commerce Department for a year and a half. Without any false modesty, I would say, I knew how to work with the Congress. Johnson appreciated that. He didn't have many people who understood -- really understood -- how the political system worked. I don't mean this was bribery or greasing anybody's hands or anything. You've just got to understand how the system functions. You work with it instead of against it. People like -- well, I probably shouldn't name names. But Bob McNamara never understood how the Congress functioned. He couldn't understand why he was getting battered from time to time. But I knew how to make it work, not all the time, but I understood how to deal with it. I'm happy to say my nose was clean and my hands are clean, and people generally liked me. I had a fair amount of knowledge about aviation. As I've said, from my work at the Florida Turnpike Authority, and then I've been a member and chairman of the Florida

Public Utilities Commission, so I understood something about railroad operation and truck operation and bus operation. I wasn't an expert, but, except for maritime, I had a pretty good feel for all of those modes.

Schrag: So you came in as someone who had good relations with Congress, who knew lots of different parts of the transportation industry. It's only after your appointment then that people like Weaver and Sitton start exposing you to the downsides of urban freeways. Also, you become a little more public. Again, it seems like the Three Sisters bridge is the first moment where you do begin to make enemies.

Boyd: That was sort of an epiphany to me, to tell you the truth. I had looked at some of these urban operations, urban expressways, without being -- I remember the Kennedy in Chicago. I saw it carving up all of the communities in northwest Chicago and asking myself, "Why does this have to be?" But I hadn't really given much thought to it until it sort of landed on my desk.

Schrag: Since you had been in Washington since 1959, could I ask you a bit about your relations with the city as

a local place? Where did you live? Did you know people like Libby Rowe, who were sort of part of the Washington establishment?

Boyd: I lived at -- we rented an apartment at 4600 Connecticut Avenue in the District. I did know Libby Rowe and Jim Rowe, her husband. I did not -- I was on speaking terms -- I don't mean any emotional thing. I just was not close to anybody in the District government. I knew the people. I talked to them on occasion. I really just -- I did not get involved in the city at all.

Schrag: Had you been even just following in the newspapers any of the debate over rapid transit?

Boyd: Oh, yes.

Schrag: And the Northwest Freeway?

Boyd: Yes. I was an avid reader of the paper. I had and still have a basic interest in all forms of transportation and a curiosity about things.

Schrag: What were your feelings about the rapid transit proposals of the mid-1960s?

Boyd: I don't remember any of the specifics, but I was all in favor of rapid transit, because I couldn't see

where the hell the traffic was going [to go] on the streets where they were going to put the automobiles, and they kept building new buildings.

Schrag: Let me ask you this. One of your most surprising appointments in, I believe it was June 1967, was Peter Craig, who had been perhaps the most effective of all the anti-freeway activists in Washington. He had helped kill the Northwest Freeway and went on to fight the Three Sisters bridge. You picked him up as assistant general counsel for litigation, which, again, from the highway lobby point of view, was just appalling. You were denounced in the AAA [American Automobile Association] magazine and all the rest.

Boyd: [Laughter]. Yes.

Schrag: I guess my question is then, since you had been paying attention to the Washington freeway fight, did you know that appointing Craig would be seen as a betrayal of all that was holy by the highway advocates?

Boyd: Yes, I think so, because I knew those fellows pretty well. I liked them, but they had a very simple view of life: You're either with me or against me. I

picked Peter Craig for several reasons, the most important of which was that he was a hell of a good lawyer. He had certainly proved that. I really didn't -- it didn't bother me that some of these people were upset, because Peter Craig was an honorable man. He did not do anything underhand. He was out in the open about how he felt about things. He did his job conscientiously and honestly.

Schrag: If I understand it, that's the same feeling you had about the planners in the Bureau of Public Roads. That is, both Craig and they were not doing this out of personal self-interest.

Boyd: Oh, no.

Schrag: They were doing it out of a belief in what they thought good policy was.

Boyd: Right. These people were -- the planners in the Public Roads were really nice people, good friends. They were living what they had been taught, what they had grown up with. They couldn't -- with a few exceptions, they couldn't bring themselves to a different perspective. I'm not critical of that, because I find that I'm hung up on some things and I

just can't get around to the other side and look at it from another way. But they were -- there was nothing of any personal agenda, to my mind, with these people.

Schrag: How about Congress then? During the Three Sisters dispute you had run-ins with George Fallon, [John] Kluczynski, and William Natcher. Fallon and Kluczynski eventually put together the 1968 highway act that seems to be an attempt to overrule you, saying that the Three Sisters bridge will be built regardless of any court decision. How were your dealings with that committee in particular, the Public Works Committee:

Boyd: I had a great time with George Fallon and Kluczynski. They were good friends. The counsel for the committee was Dick Sullivan, a big old Irishman from New York. George Fallon was from Maryland and Kluczynski from Chicago. We differed. We used to have some great arguments, but they were all very friendly. I certainly felt that George and Klu were good friends, and I would be surprised if they wouldn't have said the same thing about me. They would have said, "He just doesn't understand."



Natcher was a different animal. Natcher was a fellow you didn't deal with. At least I couldn't. He was -- I found him to be cold and closed. When he made up his mind on something, that was it, as far as he was concerned. Either you went his way or there was no way to go. So Mr. Natcher and I never had any relationship really.

Schrag: Interesting. So you could have this -- you know, I have the hearing transcripts and so forth, and they seem rather antagonistic, some of the exchanges between, say, you and Fallon. But at the end of the day you could sit down and have a beer and not take it personally.

Boyd: Oh, yes.

Schrag: Whereas Natcher was not --

Boyd: Not that way at all.

Schrag: I've been trying to figure out Natcher and what he really wanted, and he doesn't, in retrospect, seem all that bright, quite honestly.

Boyd: That is my impression also. And my further impression is that he had a view of Congress, or at least of his role in Congress, as being one where when he had spoken, everybody was supposed to sit up

and take notice and acquiesce. I think he -- I don't know whether he's still alive.

Schrag: No. He was buried with his voting card after voting eighteen-thousand consecutive votes in a row.

Boyd: I think he was a very honorable man. I never thought he was very bright. I thought that he had sort of an imperial vision of Congress, that he really resented people taking different positions from his.

Schrag: To go back to Kluczynski and Fallon, did you ever feel that you were able to get them to question the desirability of these urban interstates -- particularly Fallon who, I believe, represented Baltimore. Were you able to show him the stevedore's view of the world?

Boyd: No. They were -- I won't say George was beholden to the highway people, but they were better friends of his than I was because they kept pumping money into his campaigns and his campaign coffers. I think George was a -- I don't think he ever really thought about alternatives, although he may have been supportive of a subway operation in Baltimore. I can't remember.

Schrag: I'll have to look that up.

Boyd: As well as highways. I'm not sure about that. But George was a very decent human being, I thought. I liked George.

Schrag: What about the highway lobbyists themselves -- the AAA, the oil, the rubber associations. Did you ever have any direct dealings with them?

Boyd: Oh, yes. I used to have lunch with some of them sometimes. There was a group known as the "road gang," which had representatives from all of those industries you mentioned, as well as the -- what was the contractors' association? Anyway, they used to have lunch at -- I'm losing my memory. What the hell is the name of the old hotel that's been refurbished?

Schrag: The Willard?

Boyd: Yes, the Willard, every once in a while. Or they did regularly. I was invited every once in a while. These people -- a lot of them were good personal friends. I didn't have a lot of close friends in Washington, and these were people I knew and liked. I think some of them were certainly more intelligent than some of the members of Congress. I think some

of them thought they could sell me on a different approach. Others hated my guts from a policy point of view.

Schrag: Again, not a sense of personal animus.

Boyd: No, no.

Schrag: Did you have any direct dealings with people in the DC government, the appointed government? That is, you had General Mathe, who was the engineer commissioner in charge of public works in DC and under him the DC Highway Department. I found some correspondence between you and Mathe that, if I understand it correctly, Peter Craig was trying to get some information that would now be covered by the Freedom of Information Act, some basic data that the DC department was using in its assumption. The DC Highway Department was tired of him, and they would say, "Go away." You would write a letter saying, "No, actually you have to divulge this information." But I don't know if there was any kind of relationship beyond --

Boyd: I don't think so. I don't recall any. My sense is that most of the relationships between DC and the

DOT were carried on either through the general counsel's office or Lowell Bridwell's office.

Schrag: Let me ask you this. Writing my dissertation about Metro, it seems to me that -- you know, I have this sort of Washington-centric view of the world, and I'm trying to put the Three Sisters bridge in its correct context compared to all the other highway fights that were going around in Boston and New Orleans and San Francisco and everywhere else. But even though there were these disputes nationwide, I don't think I'm the only one who thinks that the Three Sisters bridge was really a centerpiece to the national debate. The New York Times called it the "Dien Bien Phu of the highway fight." There were editorials about it in newspapers across the country.

Boyd: I think it was sort of -- if there is such a word -- iconic. It was an icon.

Schrag: So would it be fair to say that when, for example, Fallon and Kluczynski inserted it as its own line item in the highway bill, essentially forcing Johnson to approve it or lose the whole highway

bill, that what was at stake was not this mile-long bridge but a whole philosophy toward road-building?

Boyd: Yes, I think so. I think that's a fair statement.

Schrag: Just the way this works out -- they do sign the bill. Johnson does sign the bill that's forced on him by the Public Works Committee. Then the endgame to all of this is actually after the election of 1968. So there is this lame duck period. It's then in December of 1968 that you approve a new highway plan for DC that would delete the Three Sisters bridge, require additional study for some of the freeways through the black neighborhoods, and approve a new freeway parallel to New York Avenue that would connect up with what is now I-95. That would be the access to the beltway and to Baltimore. Then Bridwell actually signs off on this on January 17<sup>th</sup>, 1969. So with only three days left in the Johnson administration there is this sort of midnight approval of a new highway system for DC. Is there any -- did you expect that to stick, I guess is my question, given that a new administration was coming in? How did you decide to

go ahead and delete the bridge after all that you had been through?

Boyd: [Laughter]. Well, part of it was a game, like the language that Fallon and Kluczynski included in the bill. It was a serious game. I couldn't call it a game. But I thought that it was just dreadfully wrong to build that damn bridge and come chopping in to Georgetown. I thought it was the right thing to do. I've forgotten why the timing was what it was. As to whether I thought it would hold, I think I was really dubious, because I knew that John Volpe, who succeeded me -- John was a friend -- had been interested in highways when he was governor and pro-highway. When it was announced that John was going to be my successor, I talked to John about the department. In passing, I said, "Among other things, for God's sake, whatever you do, don't make Frank Turner highway administrator, because Frank is just so dead-set on building concrete." John said, "Well, I've already told him he's going to be highway administrator." [Laughter]. So I was dubious about whether it would hold. I want to be clear. I was very fond of Frank Turner as a person.

I liked Frank very much, but I sure didn't like his philosophy.

Anyway, as you know, it dragged on. Finally Bill Coleman killed it off.

Schrag: Yes. Though, of course, Peter Craig played a big hand in the lawsuit against Volpe. You're right that it's astonishing what he was able to accomplish as a private citizen.

If I understand your philosophy, there is a sense that war is too important to be left to the generals, and highway-building is too important to be left to the engineers.

Boyd: Absolutely.

Schrag: What about the Fallon position? You were sort of holding the Bureau of Public Roads in check. But Fallon and Kluczynski thought that, as elected officials, they knew better than you, and they sort of trumped your cards by writing these segments into the highway act. Was that a legitimate piece of legislation, or was that Congress stepping into -- I know that Congress had this tradition prior to that of not specifying individual segments of --



Boyd: I think Congress -- I think the Public Works Committee really overstepped its traditional bounds. Clearly they were able to do it, but I don't think that was their business. I think they were saying, "Look, we're not only an equal branch of government, we're dominant."

Schrag: Fair enough. I guess the one remaining question I have is -- we talked about the bridge and the DC highways. What about Metro itself? I know that Metro was not a responsibility of the Department of Transportation. It was an independent agency and then later an interstate compact and doesn't really get any DOT supervision until the mid-1970s. Did you have any contact with Walter McCarter or Jackson Graham or any of the Metro officials?

Boyd: No. I talked to them on a couple of occasions, but I don't recall any real business relationship there. I think Paul Sitton probably -- well, after Paul became UMTA administrator, I think Paul had some dealings with them. But I had none that I can recall.

Schrag: That actually brings up one thing I meant to ask you, which was about Sitton himself. Again, the AAA

complained about Sitton along with Craig, in part because he was the son-in-law of Walter Loucheim , who was on the National Capital Planning Commission and another Rowe ally. Was that a fair evaluation on their part? Was Sitton's family connections --

Boyd: He was not a captive of Walter, and he was not put in that position because of Walter. Paul Sitton was a very bright, truly dedicated public official, public servant, whatever you want to call it. He had come from OMB, as I told you. Paul had some background -- I don't know what it was -- at OMB on mass transit. He knew something about it. Paul was his own man in every sense of the word. I would not have put Paul in there if he had been anti-mass-transit, of course. But Paul was -- I knew Walter and Katie Loucheim very well. I would be surprised if Paul ever talked any business with Walter.

Schrag: That's very helpful for me to have that for the record, just to clear up some of the accusations that were made.

Boyd: Paul Sitton was a very honorable human being. I would hate like hell to think that people would --

you know, there is a lot of character assassination in the world.

Schrag: Yes. And the same sorts of things were made about Craig. The DC Highway Department was just obsessed with the idea that Craig had once represented the Southern Railway. They just assumed that the only opposition he had to these freeways was that they would somehow compete with rail transportation.

Boyd: [Laughter].

Schrag: If you look at a map, you'll find that the Northwest Freeway was slated to go within a block of Peter Craig's house, so that he actually had some pretty personal reasons for getting involved long before he ever met anyone from Southern Railway. But the highway lobby -- I mean, you called them honorable -- they seemed incompletely honorable in some of their --.

Boyd: In some cases, right. And there are some -- I'm sad to tell you, there are some very small-minded people in this world who think that everything they don't quite understand is due to some sort of venal reason.

Schrag: It's just that I have talked to Peter Craig, but Sitton is not around to defend himself. So it's very helpful to have your evaluation of him.

I was trying to think if there is -- is there anything else I should know about (other than the bridge) the other segments. I know the bridge -- it seems to me that there were sort of two freeway fights going on in Washington -- one over the bridge, which was more white people in Georgetown and Cleveland Park concerned about aesthetics; and then there was the Northeast Freeway, which was a lot more African-Americans concerned about losing their homes and being cut off. Did you have any kind of direct dealings with those people, the Emergency Committee on the Transportation Crisis, for example?

Boyd: I remember I met several times with Walter Fauntroy. Where Walter was in this, I don't know. I know he was very concerned about the freeway, the Northeast Freeway. He was also very much concerned about getting -- he wanted to get Metro built.

Schrag: This was when he was appointed to the council, or do you remember when?

Boyd: I can't remember the time.

Schrag: He wore so many hats at different times.

Boyd: I can't remember. I know it was after I became secretary, but beyond that I can't give you a --

Schrag: Okay. But he was definitely, in one capacity or another, a significant spokesperson for that community.

Boyd: Absolutely, yes.

Schrag: I just wondered, did you have any dealings with -- there were some radicals well to the left of him -- Sammie Abbott and Reginald Booker. I don't know if --

Boyd: I don't think so. I remember reading something about Sammy Abbott, an article in the Post several years ago or something like that. But I don't recall having ever met him.

Schrag: Okay. That's very helpful as well. In part, it's just interesting to see which activists actually get the attention of people in power. Sometimes it takes different kinds. I might have asked this before, but I just want to clarify. Was Johnson ever personally involved in any of this, other than

I know he had to decide whether to sign the highway act that mandated construction of the Three Sisters bridge. But did you ever have to sit down and get a decision from him?

Boyd: No. I don't have any recollection of that. He and I had sort of a practice -- it was his idea -- of having lunch together about once every two weeks. I would sort of -- it was upstairs in his private quarters, just the two of us. I would fill him in on what was going on. He may have said to me on some occasion, "Well, you know, you had better do this. You ought to think about that," or something like that. But, no. Other than that, we never had any -- I tried to keep him informed, because he was taking a lot of political heat for me. I didn't want him to be blind-sided. I don't have any recollection of him ever saying, "I want you to do this," or, "Send this to me for a decision."

Schrag: I came across one memo from Stephen Pollak, who was his advisor on DC affairs, saying, "We're going to try to insulate you, keep you out of this mess." That certainly seems consistent with other things we know.

Those are all the questions I have prepared, unless you think that there is something that I should have asked about that I've missed.

Boyd: I don't think of anything, Zachary. When I read the transcript, if I think of anything else I believe would be helpful, I'll give it to you.

Schrag: Excellent. Okay. I'll stop the recording now.  
Thank you so much.

Boyd: It's a pleasure to talk to you, and good luck in your dissertation.

Schrag: Thank you.

[End of Interview]

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